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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Clayton appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction, Suspended 
Sentence, and Order of probation, wherein the district court imposed a unified sentence 
of ten years, with three years fixed, for Ms. Clayton's plea to felony injury of a child. 
Additionally, Ms. Clayton appeals from the district court's "perpetual" no contact order, 
precluding Ms. Clayton from having contact with her three minor children. On appeal, 
Ms. Clayton argues that the no contact order is facially invalid because it has no 
termination date which is required by I.C.R. 46.2 and Idaho Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting that rule. Ms. Clayton also challenges a term of her probation and the no 
contact order which preclude her from communicating with her youngest child on the 
basis that they violate Ms. Clayton's fundamental right to parent. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Clayton was indicted for two counts of felony injury to children and two 
counts of felony witness intimidation. (R., pp.23-26.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Ms. Clayton pleaded guilty to one count of felony injury to a child. (08/27/10 Tr., p.2, L.9 
- p.3, L.23; R., pp.71-72.) In return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, 
seek a suspended ten year sentence, seek no contact between Ms. Clayton and A.C. 
and A.C., and to seek supervised contacts between Ms. Clayton and her youngest child, 
A.D. 1 (08/27/10 Tr., p.2, L.9 - p.3, L.23; R., pp.71-72.) The district court found that 
1 Ms. Clayton has three minor children with the initials A.C., A.C., and AD. (PSI, pp.11-
12.) 
1 
there was a factual basis for Ms. Clayton's plea and accepted it. (08/27/10 Tr., p.20, 
L.22 - p.21, L.8.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that Ms. Clayton have 
supervised contacts with her youngest child, AD. (11/09/10 Tr., p.40, Ls.8-23.) The 
district court imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with three years fixed, suspended the 
sentence, and placed Ms. Clayton on probation for ten years. (R., pp.81-86.) In 
addition, the district court entered a term of probation precluding Ms. Clayton from 
contacting her three minor children, and entered a no contact order precluding 
Ms. Clayton from having any contact with her three minor children. (R., p.84; R., p. 79.) 
Additionally, the no contact order did not designate an expiration date and stated it will 
expire upon the dismissal of the case. (R., p.79.) Ms. Clayton timely filed a notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.88-90.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Is the district court's no contact order facially invalid because it has no 
discernable expiration date? 
2. Does the district court's no contact order and terms of probation both violate 




The District Court's No Contact Order Is Facially Invalid Because It Has No Discernable 
Expiration Date 
A. Introduction 
The no contact order in this matter is facially invalid. According to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 46.2 (hereinafter, I.C.R. 46.2), and Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of that 
rule, no contact orders are required to have an expiration date. The district court 
entered a no contact order which has no expiration date and is, therefore, facially 
invalid. 
8. The District Court's No Contact Order Is Facially Invalid Because It Has No 
Discernable Expiration Date 
1. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the following standard of review for 
appeals involving a lower court's interpretation of criminal rules: 
Where the lower court's decision turns on the interpretation of a criminal 
rule, this Court exercises free review. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91-
92, 90 P.3d 314, 316-317 (2004) (reviewing the trial court's interpretation 
of I.C.R. 11 (c)); State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 
(1997) (reviewing the trial court's interpretation of I.C.R. 25(a}}. 
State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175 (2008). 
2. The District Court's No Contact Order Is Facially Invalid Because It Has 
No Discernable Expiration Date 
I.C.R. 46.2, which governs no contact orders was amended in 2004 and contains 
the following language, "That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or 
upon dismissal of the case." The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the preceding 
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language from !.C.R. 46.2 to mean that no contact orders must include a termination 
date. State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 176 (2008). The Supreme Court's language 
follows: 
Id. 
The language of amended I.C.R. 46.2, requiring inclusion of a termination 
date in no contact orders, serves important public interests. In the future, 
in all cases which come before the trial courts of this state for hearing on a 
motion to modify or terminate a no contact order entered prior to July 1, 
2004, we expect judges to provide a termination date, regardless of 
whether the motion to modify or terminate the no contact order is granted. 
These principles were elaborated on in State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769 (2010), 
where the no contact order at issue "was to remain effective until dismissal of the case." 
Id. at 772. In applying I.C.R. 46.2 and its decision in Castro, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: 
Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 requires an expiration date on all no contact 
orders. While the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in 
State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 (2008), at the time the 
motion was denied, in that case we disapproved of no contact orders with 
"eternal existence" and indicated that all no contact orders issued after 
July 1, 2004, should have termination dates, regardless of whether a 
motion to modify or terminate the no contact order is granted. Id. at 175-
76, 177 P.3d at 389-90. The district court should have observed that, 
without a termination date, the no contact order would, unless modified, 
have perpetual existence because, based upon the disposition of the 
case, it would never be dismissed.FN1 
Cobler, 148 Idaho at 772. The footnote was intentionally left in the preceding citation 
because it contains the language used in the form no contact order utilized by the 
district court in Cobler, which follows: 
The problem in this case may have arisen by virtue if the form utilized by 
the magistrate court when the no contact order was entered. The form 
states: 
THIS ORDER CAN BE MODIFIED ONLY BY A JUDGE AND WILL 
EXPIRE: 
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at 11 :59 p.m. on _____ or upon dismissal of this case. 
Id. 
The language in Ms. Clayton's no contact order follows: "THIS ORDER CAN BE 
MODIFIED ONLY BY A JUDGE AND WILL EXPIRE AT 11 :59 p.m. on 
------------ OR UPON DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE, WHICHEVER 
FIRST OCCURS." (R., p.79.) It is important to note that this case is from Ada County, 
the Cobler case was also from Ada County and the form no contact order used by the 
district court in this case is the same form no contact order the Idaho Supreme Court 
criticized in the foregoing footnote. Here, the district court circled the word dismissal but 
did not fill in the blank to reflect an expiration date. Since the no contact order in this 
case does not have an expiration date, it runs afoul the clear imperative that judges are 
to provide termination dates on all no contact orders. See Castro and Cobler, supra. 
Moreover, the district court circled the word dismissal in this case, which can be used to 
infer that the district court intended the no contact order to remain in force until the case 
was dismissed. However, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the no contact order in 
Cobler, would have perpetual existence because it terminated upon the dismissal of the 
case and in that case Mr. Cobler pleaded guilty. Here, Ms. Clayton pleaded guilty and 
therefore her case will never be dismissed and the no contact order will have a 
perpetual existence, which is virtually identical to Mr. Cobler's situation. (08/27/10 
Tr., p.2, L.9 - p.3, L.23; R., pp.71-72.) 
In sum, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that I.C.R. 46.2 requires that courts 
place termination dates on no contact orders. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Cobler, the district court in this case should have observed that this no contact order 
would have a perpetual existence and is contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in 
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Castro. Since this no contact order is facially invalid it should be remanded to the 
district court with instructions to issue a new order with a termination date. 
C. The District Court's No Contact Order Constitutes Fundamental Error Because 
It Violates Ms. Clayton's Constitutional Due Process Rights And Freedom Of 
Association 
Since the no contact order was not objected to below, and assuming, arguendo, 
that its facial invalidity alone does not require it be automatically remanded, it can be 
challenged for the first time on appeal because it amounts to fundamental error. In 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court recently clarified the 
test for fundamental error. In order to make a showing of fundamental error, the 
defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the error was of constitutional magnitude - i.e. 
that one or more of the defendant's un-waived constitutional rights were violated; (2) 
that the error was plain on the face of the record and that the failure to object was not 
the product of a tactical decision; and (3) that the error was prejudicial, which requires 
the defendant to show a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome 
of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Ms. Clayton submits that she meets this 
standard. 
The no contact order regulates Ms. Clayton's First Amendment right to speak, 
communicate, and otherwise associate with her children. The right to communicate and 
the right of association with others are among the activities that are constitutionally 
protected conduct under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 
is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 322 (1990) (First Amendment 
embraces the freedom to effectively communicate with others); Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); cf. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. V. Newdow, 542 
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U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (recognizing in dicta that a parent's right to communicate with his or 
her child is protected under the First Amendment). As such, criminal no contact orders 
regulate constitutionally protected conduct. See also Madsen v. Women's Health 
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (treating an injunction against anti-abortion protestors 
as a prior restraint on speech). Since the no contact order infringes on Ms. Clayton's 
First Amendment right to speak and associate with other individuals, it violates her most 
basic of constitutional rights. Additionally, the magnitude of the no contact order's 
infringement upon Ms. Clayton's constitutionally protected liberty interests is amplified 
by the fact that Ms. Clayton is subject to independent criminal liability for any violation of 
the no contact order. See LC. § 18-920. 
The plain error in this matter is apparent from the face of the record. In State v. 
Castro, 145 Idaho 173 (2008) and State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that I.C.R. 46.2 requires all no contact orders to have 
expiration dates. Ms. Clayton's no contact order has no expiration date, so it is not in 
compliance with LC.R. 46.2 and both Castro and Cobler. For a further elaboration on 
this point see Section 1(8)(2) supra. 
Trial counsel could have no tactical reason for its failure to object to this no 
contact order. The terms of Ms. Clayton's probation have the same restriction 
contained in the no contact order, to wit, Ms. Clayton is to have no contact with her 
three youngest children. (R., p.84.) Since Ms. Clayton's probationary period is to last 
ten years, the terms of her probation are to last for ten years. (R., p.82.) The State was 
agreeing to a ten year period of probation, and thus a ten year limitation on 
Ms. Clayton's ability to speak with her minor children. (11/09/10 Tr., p.32, Ls.8-14.) 
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Since the State was agreeing to a ten year no contact limitation, trial counsel had no 
tactical reason to avoid objecting to a period which exceeded ten years. 
Additionally, the State was operating on the assumption that the period of no 
contact would be around ten years. This is evinced by the following statements made 
by the State at the sentencing hearing: 
My concern has been from the beginning that she does not get the opportunity to 
influence and, I guess, parent in the way that she has been without the Court's 
supervision and/or another third party entity .... 
(11/09/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-11.) The State went on to state: 
If Ms. Clayton wants in the next ten years to get some kind of contact with 
her kids, I think she has at this moment in time a very long road in making 
some kind of reconciliation with what she has done, and hoping that she 
will be safe when she has interactions with them. 
(11/09/10 Tr., p.34, Ls.20-25.) The State was recommending some sort of supervised 
contact after a period of ten years. There would be no tactical reason for Ms. Clayton's 
trial counsel to fail to object to a perpetual no contact order in light of the fact that her 
probation was to last ten years, and that the State was recommending some sort of 
contact which could begin following the ten years. In other words, the fact that the 
perpetual nature of no contact order was not the result of a bargain, is inconsistent with 
the State's recommendation, and is inconsistent with the probation terms ordered by the 
district court substantiate the contention that there could be no tactical reason for 
Ms. Clayton's trial attorney to fail to object to its perpetual nature. 
This error is prejudicial because it will preclude Ms. Clayton from ever speaking 
with her three youngest children. Since it is perpetual, the no contact order will prevent 
Ms. Clayton from communicating with her children after they have reached adulthood. 
This restriction is overly broad because her children should be able to speak with their 
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mother after they reach eighteen years of age. Therefore, this restriction on 
Ms. Clayton's First Amendment rights is inherently prejudicial. 
In sum, the perpetual no contact order infringes on Ms. Clayton's First 
Amendment right to free speech and the derivative right of free association. The 
perpetual nature of the no contact order is facially invalid and trial counsel had no 
tactical reason to avoid objecting to it. Finally, the perpetual nature of the no contact 
order will far exceed its purpose of protecting Ms. Clayton's children after they reach the 
age of majority, and is therefore inherently prejudicial. 
11. 
The District Court's No Contact Order And Terms Of Her Probation Both Violate 
Ms. Clayton's Fundamental Right As A Parent In Relation To Her Youngest Child 
A Introduction 
Ms. Clayton asserts that the no-contact order and the terms of her probation 
unconstitutionally interfere with her fundamental right as A.D.'s parent Since the right 
to a parent is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies, and the district court's no contact 
order and the terms of her probation must be narrowly tailored to meet the State's 
interest in protecting Ms. Clayton's children. Ms. Clayton submits that the district court 
could adequately protect her youngest child, AD., by ordering supervised contact 
pursuant to the State's recommendation at sentencing. 
B. The District Court's No Contact Order And Terms Of Her Probation Both Violate 
Ms. Clayton's Fundamental Right As A Parent In Relation To Her Youngest Child 
The right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of 
their children has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court as a fundamental right. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Leavitt v. 
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Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 670 (2006). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides heightened protections against governmental interference where 
fundamental rights and liberty interests are at stake. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. The 
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is "perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests," recognized by the courts. Id. This interest 
includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children." Id. (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). A strict prohibition against a parent 
having any contact whatsoever with his or her child is necessarily an interference with 
this fundamental right. As such, the imposition of the no contact order issued in this 
case is subject to the strict requirements of due process since the terms of that order 
interfere with Mr. Clayton's fundamental rights as a parent. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has established that the State may not interfere with 
the exercise of the fundamental rights of a parent absent clear and convincing proof that 
the State's action is necessary for the protection or best interests of the child. In the 
Interests of Doe, 144 Idaho 534 (2007) (State action terminating a parent's rights must 
be supported by clear and convincing evidence); Leavitt, 142 Idaho at 670, 132 P.3d at 
427 (applying clear and convincing evidence standard to decisions regarding the 
visitation rights of grandparents); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-748 
(1982). Here, the district court concluded that Ms. Clayton's psychological evaluation 
convinced it that Ms. Clayton's children are at a high risk for continued abuse should 
they have any contact with her. (11/09/10 Tr., p.48, Ls.1-12.) There was evidence from 
Ms. Clayton's psychological evaluation, which was relied on by the district court, 
indicating that Ms. Clayton should not be A.D.'s primary caretaker. (11/09/10 Tr., p.48, 
Ls.1-12; PSI, pp.233-249.) However, the psychological evaluation did not conclude that 
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all contact between Ms. Clayton and A.O. should be terminated. This is consistent with 
the State's recommendation that Ms. Clayton should be allowed supervised visitation 
with A.O. (11/09/1 O Tr., p.40, Ls.8-23.) Therefore, the record does not contain clear 
and convincing evidence that Ms. Clayton should not have supervised visitation rights 
with A.O. 
Additionally, when the State infringes upon a fundamental liberty interest, that 
infringement must be narrowly tailored to meet the State's Interest. According to the 
United State's Supreme Court "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of 'due 
process of law' to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to 
infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (citing to Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 
125 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)) (emphasis in original). The 
State does have a compelling interest to protect A.O. However, Ms. Clayton submits 
that severing all contact between herself and A.O. constitutes an overly restrictive 
means to achieve that end. As recommended by the State and agreed to by her trial 
counsel, Ms. Clayton should be allowed to have supervised visitation rights with A.O. 
(11/09/10 Tr., p.40, Ls.8-23.) A.O. can have a third party monitor and be present during 
her visits to ensure that Ms. Clayton acts appropriately. Since there is a less restrictive 
means to achieve the State's interest, the no contact order and probation terms are not 
narrowly tailored and therefore violate Ms. Clayton's substantive due process rights. 
In light of the fact that clear and convincing evidence was not presented that the 
no contact order was necessary for the protection of A.O., and since supervised visits 
are sufficient to meet the State's interest in protecting A.O., the State has violated 
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Ms. Clayton's fundamental rights as a parent by entering a no contact order and 
requiring as a term of her probation that Ms. Clayton sever all contacts with A.O. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Clayton respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the district 
court with instructions to issue a no contact order with an expiration date and with 
instructions to allow supervised visitation between Ms. Clayton and A.O., with the 
specific constraints to be determined by the district court. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2011. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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